The capability approach constitutes a significant contribution to social theory but its potential is diminished by its insufficient treatment of the social construction of meaning. Social meanings enable people to make value judgements about what they will do and be, and also to evaluate how satisfied they are about what they are able to achieve. From this viewpoint, a person's state of wellbeing must be understood as being socially and psychologically co-constituted in specific social and cultural contexts. In this light, the telos of 'living well' which is at the heart of Sen's version of the capability approach is inadequate and must be modified to a telos of 'living well together' which includes consideration of the social structures and institutions which enable people to pursue individual freedoms in relation to others. The policy significance of the capability approach can be further strengthened by paying greater consideration to the political economy of policy decision-making processes and the ways in which conflicts and distributions of power are institutionalized.
The economist Amartya Sen introduced the concept of 'capabilities' in the 1980s as a way of thinking about human wellbeing that departed from the utilitarian approach which dominates modern economics. The concept has been developed into what is now widely known as 'the capability approach'; a framework which accommodates social, economic and political analysis and which holds that the wellbeing of a person ought to be assessed in the space of capabilities.
In this article, we will provide a brief description of the key elements of Sen's capability approach and outline what can be considered its distinctive contributions to contemporary social science thinking. However, the main purpose of this article is to evaluate the extent to which the capability approach can be regarded as a foundation for the emergence of a new paradigm for policy relevant social sciences. The current waves of global crisis: from the headline financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 ; through the ongoing crisis of chronic global poverty; to the emerging challenges of climate change have all stimulated speculation about the need for a new paradigm for the social sciences and particularly in how it relates to public policy thinking.
The Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress ('the Sarkozy Commission') challenges politicians, academics and policy-makers to engage in a renewed debate over how we are to understand and shape societal development in a world beset by economic, social and environmental crises. Established by the French government in 2008, the Commission drew together a large number of scholars and was co-chaired by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi to reflect on the current challenges to how we think about and measure the relationship between economic performance and societal development. The Commission report recognizes that what we measure shapes the policy choices we make and advocates 'a shift of emphasis from a ''production-oriented'' measurement system to one focussed on the well-being of current and future generations, i.e. toward broader measures of human progress' (Report of the Sarkozy Commission, 2009: 10) .
The findings of the Sarkozy Commission contribute to a groundswell of academic and policy rethinking at all levels; from a focus at the local level on how men, women and children in particular social contexts strive for and either succeed or fail to achieve some degree of wellbeing, 1 to those engaged with systems of global governance which shape the contexts in which we live. 2 These initiatives advance an alternative framework which seeks to liberate our understanding of the relationship between human and societal development (and our consequent public policy deliberation) from an economistic paradigm over-focussed on material growth. 3 In this article, we argue that the capability approach has made a substantial contribution to shaping the emergent paradigm to which these various initiatives relate, but that further development of the paradigm is required. Currently the capability approach does not sufficiently or consistently take account of the social, and therefore political, nature of human wellbeing. Despite Sen's desire to argue away from the oppression of contemporary orthodox economics, the capability approach has, as yet, to fully benefit from better integrated contributions from sociology, social anthropology and political science. This leads to an uneven account of the role of power, in all its forms, in its approach to the construction of human wellbeing. This weakness, and particularly at the level of social meanings, reduces its traction in its engagement with the practical political challenges of promoting human wellbeing in an unequal world. This is made apparent in Sen's latest book, The Idea of Justice (2009), which, while praising the role of public discussion and deliberation in constructing more just institutional arrangements and states of affairs, fails to take realistic account of the often disruptive influence of power dynamics that are highlighted by a more social conception of human life.
Sen's capability approach focuses on the telos of 'living well' but we argue here that it is necessary to take account of the telos of 'living well together', expanding the social conditions in which it is possible for people to live well in relation to others in society. Our struggles to live well take place within the inter-subjective space of human relationships. The term 'living well together', which is derived from Paul Ricoeur's 'structures of living together ' (1992) , seeks to encapsulate the reality that the individual and social projects of living well co-constitute each other. This moves us to a dynamic conception of the relationship between 'the individual' and 'the community' and, indicates that the term 'community' in itself does not adequately capture the usually contested and conflicted nature of the interplay between different individual projects of 'living well'.
Sen's formulation of the capability approach holds the expansion of individual freedoms as the central objective of societal development, but a social conception of human wellbeing reinforces the view that these are always defined and realized through our relationships to others. This critique is developed in this article through an examination of the centrality of the role of meanings and values: what we value -in this case, the 'freedoms that people have reason to value' (Sen, 1992: 81) -is built from the meanings that we share with others.
Our emphasis on the social character of shared meanings draws our attention to the tendency in some of Sen's writing to conflate 'doings' and 'beings'. They are often talked of in the same breath with insufficient space for consideration of how we are to understand the relationships between the two (McGregor, 2007) . Socially constructed meanings are essential for all human life, and are what enable people to translate their 'doings' into states of 'being'. The social meanings that we bring to bear on the conception of wellbeing in our different societies then also provide the basis for how we think and feel about ourselves and others (Seel, 1997) . We conclude by discussing the implications of a social constructivist approach to human wellbeing for how we think of policy choices. We argue that the capability approach must be enriched to confront the reality of trade-offs between competing conceptions of wellbeing and that this entails an explicit absorption of an analysis of power and the conflicts which permeate human relationships through our struggles to 'live well together'.
The distinctiveness of the capability approach
The capability approach contains three main concepts: functionings, capabilities and agency. 4 Functionings are the valuable activities and states that become a person's wellbeing -such as a healthy body, being safe, being educated, having a good job, being able to move and visit people. Sen defines functionings as 'the various things a person may value doing or being' (Sen, 1999: 75) . Capabilities refer to the freedoms one has to do these valuable activities or reach these valuable states. Sen (1992: 40) defines the concept of capability as the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead one type of life or another . . . to choose from possible livings.
Or, in an alternative definition, capabilities are 'the substantive freedoms' a person 'enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value' (Sen, 1999: 87) . The notion of capability is closely related to Sen's conception of freedom, which he defines as 'the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value ' (1992: 31) . Sen distinguishes this opportunity aspect of freedom from the process aspect which is 'the freedom involved in the process itself ' (2002: 10) . This relates to the concept of agency, which for Sen is the ability to pursue goals that one has reason to value. In other words, the capability approach entails a key normative argument that social arrangements should aim to expand people's capabilities, that is, their freedom to undertake or achieve valuable doings and beings, and in doing so those arrangements should respect people's agency.
We can identify four main ways in which the capability approach has contributed to a new approach for the social sciences and policy thinking. First, it argues for human beings and their quality of life to be the central focus of policy. This stands against an accumulated tendency in applied social sciences to focus on the means to promote the quality of life as ends in themselves (for example, economic growth). Second, it conceives human freedom and the ability to make decisions that affect one's life as central to human dignity. Hitherto bureaucratized policy interventions and their associated analytical frameworks have been criticized for treating humans as the objects of policies. Third, it re-establishes ethics at the heart of policy-making. Contemporary policy processes have often over-privileged technocratic approaches to problem-solving which have overshadowed or obscured ethical considerations. Fourth, it sets itself out as an approach and not a theory. It therefore allows for flexibility in its interpretation and use, and in doing so it first and foremost provides a way of reframing many of the issues that contemporary applied social sciences address.
Human beings as ends
The capability approach emerged as a challenge to the narrow utilitarianism which dominated the discipline of economics and was concerned to rebut the tendency to conceive of poverty and inequality in terms of the income that households command or the commodities they possess. 5 Sen (1999: 70-1) gives five reasons why incomes and commodities are inadequate for assessing quality of life: (1) heterogeneity: physical and biological differences between human beings mean that they will have different requirements if their needs are to be met; (2) environmental diversity: differences in physical environments will mean that human beings in different places will require different combinations of commodities if their needs are to be met; (3) variations in social context: the different social arrangements that prevail in different societies will affect the translation of incomes or commodity into human development outcomes; (4) differences in relational perspectives: differences in customs and habits mean that there will be different commodity requirements for achieving the same capability; and (5) when considered at the household level, differential distribution within the family means that resources may not produce the same needs satisfaction outcomes for all household members. This latter point highlights one area in which Sen does demonstrate particular sensitivity for power dynamics which is over gender inequalities, where differential command over resources in households will often lead to poorer wellbeing outcomes for women and girls. 6 This argument does not suggest that incomes and commodities are unimportant but indicates that if we are concerned with wellbeing outcomes, then we need to expand the informational basis of wellbeing. Income is not an end in itself but a means to further human ends. 7 The first Human Development Report in 1990 states: 'The basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. This may appear to be a simple truth, but it is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the accumulation of commodities and financial wealth' (UNDP, 1990: 9) . A human wellbeing perspective on societal development is thus not captured by aggregate income measures and is not about what people have, but about what they are able to do and to be with what they have: such as living long and healthy lives, being educated, having a voice to participate in decisions which affect their lives.
The capability approach has focused largely on objective manifestations of human wellbeing (for example, health, education, nutrition and political participation), in contrast to assessments of how well people are living based on subjective evaluations. Recently a number of economists have provided renewed enthusiasm for subjective measures, with a populist call for policy-makers to accept 'happiness' as public policy objective (cf. Layard, 2005) . 8 This emergent discourse, however, asserts what has already been considered commonplace in a range of different disciplinary traditions:
9 that greater attention must be paid to what people themselves think, feel and say about how well their lives are going.
These new contributions from economics are welcome in the way that they have provoked public discussion over the place of subjective evaluation in relation to public policy but they also muddle the academic debate. The debate is currently in flux and is confounded by the contradictory use of terminology. Although each of the terms 'happiness', 'subjective wellbeing', and 'quality of life' has its own academic history, methodology and traditions, 10 they are often used interchangeably and this means that arguments are often at crossed purposes and produce more confusion than clarity. This is particularly a problem for public debate over how the 'subjective' or 'experiential' dimension of wellbeing is to relate to policy direction and how we might broaden our notions and measurement of societal progress. For example, there is particular confusion around the semantics of the term 'happiness': the Western conception of happiness, as used by Layard and harking back to Bentham's roots of utilitarianism, is not the same as the Buddhist conception of happiness, as mobilized in the Bhutanese or Thai efforts to reshape the focus of development and public policy. Confusing Layard's 'happiness' with the Buddhist conception underplays the significant emphasis on the social and psychological dimensions of human wellbeing that are embedded in the latter. The Buddhist conception relates more to the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonic wellbeing than to the hedonic notion of happiness which has been the guiding light for Layard and others.
These semantic confusions are important and can only be noted briefly here, but what is of overriding importance is the agreement around the message that what people think and feel about their own condition is important in any assessment of human wellbeing (McGregor and Sumner, 2009) .
The capability literature hitherto has been ambivalent in its attitude towards subjective evaluations, although there are signs that this is now changing (Samman, 2007) . It does not ignore the 'capability to be happy' as a valuable capability but warns of the dangers of seeing 'happiness' as an adequate wellbeing indicator. 11 This rests on recognition that a person may feel happy or be subjectively satisfied as result of the psychological adaptation which is necessary to cope with their dire life circumstances. For example, in some aspects of their lives, slum dwellers in Calcutta have been found to report themselves 'happier' than middle-class Europeans, despite the fact that they live in objectively poor accommodation struggling to make ends meet on a daily basis (Biswas-Diener and Diener, 2001 ). Because of this problem of adaptation to adverse circumstances, Sen and other capability approach protagonists, such as Martha Nussbaum, have argued that what matters is the quality of the life that people are actually living, defined by its objective conditions (whether people have access to health, education, can protest, vote, etc.) and not how they subjectively feel about their lives.
This position on subjective evaluations flirts with the murky problem of the 'false consciousness' argument. This has long been recognized as politically dangerous territory for the social sciences since the simplifications and tendencies that are induced by asserting the 'false consciousness' position (see Lockwood, 1981; Scott, 1975) represent an obstacle to understanding and engaging with people's day-to-day motivations for action. This is particularly problematic for poverty analysis in cross-cultural contexts. The 'false consciousness' 'escape clause' allows researchers and policy-makers to discount or devalue the meanings and understandings that form the basis for poor peoples' decisions and actions and in doing so opens the way for forms of paternalism where there is an assertion of 'superior' views, values and meanings which arise from higher authority, from theory or from a position of more enlightened understanding.
More recent work using the notions of 'adaptive preferences' or what psychologists refer to as 'response shift' (Appadurai, 2004; Camfield and McGregor, 2004; Clark, 2009; Elster, 1983; Lukes, 2005; Sen, 2002) , provides a potentially more constructive way of engaging with people's own perceptions. Both the 'adaptive preferences' and 'response shift' approaches focus our attention on understanding the malleability and changing nature of the meanings with which people assess their wellbeing and which represent a basis for their actions. These approaches do not in themselves imply that the meanings that some people operate with are less authentic than those of others, but they explore how such meanings are socially constructed through our relations to others.
Human freedom and agency
In addition to placing human beings at the centre of economic and social processes, the capability approach brings concern for human freedom to the fore, with its focus on capabilities and not functionings for social evaluation. Sen often refers to the contrast between a starving child and a fasting monk: they both have the same level of functioning, both are undernourished, but one has the freedom to eat if he chooses and the other hasn't. This brings the idea of positive freedom to social evaluation and is an important consideration for conventional approaches to policy evaluation.
According to Sen (1992: 150) , the contribution is two-fold: on the one hand, 'it shifts the focus from the space of means in the form of commodities and resources to that of functionings which are seen as constitutive elements of human well-being'. On the other, 'it makes it possible to take note of the set of alternative functioning vectors from which the person can choose. The capability set can be seen as the overall freedom a person enjoys to pursue her well-being.' Sen concludes that this freedom 'can be seen as being constitutive of the goodness of the society which we have reasons to pursue ' (1992: 151) . Or as he summarizes:
This approach focuses on the substantive freedoms that people have, rather than only on the particular outcomes with which they end up. For responsible adults, the concentration on freedom rather than only achievement has some merit, and it can provide a general framework for analysing individual advantage and deprivation in a contemporary society. (2002: 83) Sen calls wellbeing freedom 'one's freedom to achieve those things that are constitutive of one's well-being ' (1992: 57) . The success of public policy depends on promoting this wellbeing freedom. The aim of policy is not to push people into achieving things or reaching states that are valued by others but to give them the opportunities to achieve what they 'have reason to' value. While we can note that the approach warns against the crude imposition of values by higher authorities, it overcompensates for that tendency by failing to say much about where these 'reasoned' values come from.
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The centrality of an ethical foundation A third major contribution of the capability approach is to re-establish the normative foundations of the social sciences disciplines as they apply to policy, and to reveal the now obscured normativity of mainstream economics. In Ethics and Economics, Sen describes the ethical foundations of economics that he wants to recover: Economics has had two rather different origins, both related to politics, but related in rather different ways, concerned respectively with 'ethics', on the one hand, and with what may be called 'engineering', on the other . . . The 'engineering' approach is characterized by being concerned with primarily logistic issues rather than with ultimate ends and such questions as what may foster 'the good of man' or 'how should one live'. The ends are taken as fairly straightforwardly given, and the object of the exercise is to find the appropriate means to serve them. (1987: 3-4) The capability approach thus reasserts the centrality of value judgements about the 'good life' and the 'good society'; judgements which, since Adam Smith, neo-classical economics has progressively buried beneath mathematical functions and apparently benign axioms. There can be no separation between ethics and economics, between facts and value judgements (Putnam, 2002) . The process of societal development itself is a value-laden enterprise, for what is to be counted as development is built on different visions of a good future (Nussbaum and Sen, 1989) .
Normative deliberation on the ends of policy-making, and on human action more generally, is one of the hallmarks of the capability approach. The proposed rationality to underpin policy decision-making entirely bears upon the normative evaluation of its objectives; i.e. are the objectives 'good'? Do they enable people to live 'good' or 'better' lives? This contrasts with instrumental rationality, which has been dominant in many of the ways that the social sciences have been applied to public policy and which has been illustrated par excellence by the dominance of neo-classical economics in policy discourses: it is not the goal that is the question for the analyst but the efficiency of the means by which we get there. As Sen puts it, a decision taken according to instrumental rationality would then be similar to 'a decision expert whose response to seeing a man engaged in slicing his toes with a blunt knife is to rush to advise him that he should use a sharper knife to better serve his evident objective ' (1995: 16) .
The capability approach does not wholly reject instrumental rationality. It is useful, but only when there are clearly defined goals that have already been submitted to ethical reasoning, and when there are no disagreements about the means. This is, however, an unlikely circumstance in the real world and recourse to it is reminiscent of the neoclassical assumptions of the conditions for perfect competition. Competing meanings, goals and views on societal development and wellbeing are a political reality and, as such, politics and reasoned public deliberation might more accurately be understood as processes of adversity, accommodation and 'partisan mutual adjustment' (Lindblom 1965 ). Majone (1989) complements Lindblom's thesis by clarifying that in these inevitably political processes it is possible to identify a role for academically generated evidence and for instrumental rationality, but ultimately the process of choosing the best means to reach the agreed objective consists of arguments between value positions.
Although policy decision-making cannot escape the reality of value judgements, public policies often have been presented as an unavoidable technical solution to an objective problem. This turn of the social sciences, of course, has also been reinforced over the long haul by processes of bureaucratization and the embedding of technocratic expertise and techniques within public policy processes, but the screen of depoliticization cannot fully obscure the fact that technocratic discourses disguise value judgements about the good society (Ferguson, 1990 ).
An approach not a theory
A final strength of the capability approach is that it is not a social theory or development theory and even less a theory of justice. In its essence it does nothing more than propose that social arrangements be assessed in the space of capabilities. Reviewing the capability approach, Alkire (2005: 117) states that its major insight lies in the affirmation that 'the objective of both justice and poverty reduction should be to expand the freedom that deprived people have to enjoy ''valuable doings and beings''': [T] he capability approach is a proposition, and the proposition is this: that social arrangements should be evaluated according to the extent of freedom people have to promote or achieve functionings they value. If equality in social arrangements is to be demanded in any space -and most theories of justice advocate equality in some space -it is to be demanded in the space of capabilities. (Alkire, 2005: 122) The capability approach thus limits itself to focusing on the informational basis for ethical judgements and does not advocate some specific way of identifying what people might have reason to value. In an overview article, Robeyns (2005: 94) sees the capability approach as 'primarily and mainly a framework for thought', as a 'broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements'. She argues that poverty, inequality, wellbeing, development, marginalization or oppression are not social phenomena that the capability approach seeks to explain, but to conceptualize in the light of individual freedom. This is why, she argues, the approach cannot be ranged under the heading 'theory'. This is not to say that the capability approach is not useful to explain social issues such as female illiteracy or others (as many national Human Development Reports have done). It does provide a conceptual framework to think about female illiteracy by emphasizing the capability/functioning distinction and the importance of social arrangements and social norms (Unterhalter and Walker, 2006), but is not as such an explanatory theory for any social phenomenon.
Referring to the links between the capability approach and theories of justice, Sen argues that the idea of capability refers to 'characteristics of individual advantages' but that it 'fall[s] short of telling us enough about the fairness of or equity of the processes involved ' (2004b: 336) . The capability approach limits itself to finding an alternative evaluative space (to utility) for assessing human wellbeing, and is not concerned with the fairness, equity and efficiency of the processes involved in expanding freedoms. 13 This is a position he develops at further length in his most recent book The Idea of Justice where he argues against transcendental approaches to justice, in favour of comparative ones.
Being an approach instead of a theory adds to its potential range of application but also presents a non-partisan framework for the analysis of policies. The capability approach does not advocate either a capitalist or socialist programme of action. It is not prescriptive about the kind of institutional mix that is needed for human freedoms to be expanded, rather it offers an evaluative criteria for judging institutional arrangementsthe issue at hand is not whether they fit with one political project or the other but rather whether they expand the 'capabilities or freedoms that people have reason to value'. In this sense the capability approach seeks to be neutral in respect of a range of different ideologies and theories.
Freedom and the telos of living well together
Despite its far-reaching potential for transforming the way societal development and progress is conceived and pursued, as much in developed country contexts as in developing country contexts, 14 we argue that the main weakness of the capability approach is that it takes human freedom as the ultimate value of human life. Yet, as we have suggested, we must comprehend freedom in relation to its telos or its aim, which encompasses both the good of oneself and others, including future generations.
The capability approach, as advanced by Sen, has been criticized elsewhere for conceiving human freedom in an individualistic light. 15 This logically relates to the approach's ethical individualism in the sense that it proposes that social structures and institutions have to be 'evaluated in virtue of the causal importance that they have for individual well-being' (Robeyns, 2005 (Robeyns, : 107, 2008 . The reason given for this commitment to ethical individualism is that a focus on groups or institutions may hide forms of oppression and inequalities within the group .
In The Idea of Justice, Sen continues to restrict the evaluation space of wellbeing to that of individuals because of the priority of reasoning, which he contends is only carried out by individuals not by groups:
There is indeed no particular analytical reason why group capabilities must be excluded a priori from the discourse on justice and injustice. The case for not going that way lies in the nature of the reasoning that would be involved . . . Ultimately, it is individual evaluation on which we would have to draw, while recognizing the profound interdependence of the valuation of individuals who interact with each other . . . In valuing a person's ability to take part in the life of society, there is an implicit valuation of the life of the society itself, and that is an important enough aspect of the capability perspective. (Sen, 2009: 246) While it may be reasonable to assert that ultimately it is individual evaluation, as interdependent as they are, that we must fall back on, what is at stake here is a more rounded notion of the social nature of the human being. Rather than an ontology of the individual, what is required is a 'human ontology' (Bevan, 2007: 301) . Our reasoning is mediated by shared meanings that are consciously and subconsciously present in social interactions when negotiating what is reasonable to do and to be. In this way human wellbeing must be comprehended as being socially and psychologically co-constituted; where psychological processes engage with socially generated meanings to create the bridge between the individual human and social order. This is not a matter of 'inter-dependence' but of coconstitution. Society must be conceived of in the person and the person must be conceived of in society (Douglas and Ney 1998) . This leads us not to ethical individualism, but to an 'ethic of the social human being', in which individual freedoms are constituted by social arrangements that enable us to live well together. Despite its emphasis on reasoning, the capability approach does not offer a full and detached treatment of the meanings that enable and shape reasoning and of the powers which influence it. The frameworks of meaning that we use for individual reasoning are contested and generated in relations of power but they constitute nonetheless a fundamental form of 'irreducibly social good' (Taylor 1995) .
The politics of living well together
In the grandest functionalist sense, the challenge of human society is for human beings to find ways of organizing and structuring their relationships with each other so that we are able to live well together. The forms of shared meaning which shape these relationships are a vital element of the structuring of our societies. Bourdieu's explanation of habitus suggests that these meanings operate at conscious and subconscious levels (Bourdieu, 1977) . They are conveyed by our cultures and are manifest with increasing degrees of formalization in societal institutions which appear in a variety of forms: from societal norms to formal laws and in the written and unwritten rules of organizations. At a basic level, such meanings and relationships must enable us to meet the challenges of winning food and shelter from the planet, but also they must enable us to generate the social understandings, agreements and institutions to live together in ways that do not cause us irreparable harms.
Political science and public policy analysis both seek to understand and direct the institutional arrangements for living well together. Both recognize that what people have reason to value may differ and, given that, we need societal norms and structures that guide us in how these conflicts over these might be dealt with. This relates directly to a core debate within the capability literature: the 'list vs. non-list' debate (Gough, 2003) . Sen recognizes that what some people have 'reason to value' might conflict with what others have reason to value and this leads him to resist promoting a list of core valued human freedoms (Nussbaum, 2000:13) . Martha Nussbaum, in contrast, reasons that what people consider valuable can be the product of structures of inequality and discrimination, and that not all human freedoms are equally valuable. Therefore, she proposes a list of ten central human capabilities which should constitute universal policy objectives (2000: 78-80). Sen has no objection to Nussbaum's version, but he fears that this might become 'the only route' and 'may be tremendously overspecified ' (1993: 47) . His objections are not concerned with listing important capabilities, but with fixing one predetermined list at the theoretical level. Doing so, he argues, would be 'to deny the possibility of fruitful participation on what should be included and why' (Sen, 2004a: 77) .
This focus on participation and discussion is not matched by acknowledgement of the full consequences of the interdependent and co-constitutive character of wellbeing. First, at a more general level, we need to take into account the conflicting nature of different aspirations and strategies for wellbeing. What some people have reason to value may be detrimental to the freedoms of others, or, put more directly, they may cause them either physical or psychological harms. There is for example a growing literature in social psychology on the negative impact of individualistic, materialist values on human wellbeing. Kasser (2002) and Kasser et al. (2004) have shown how some of the freedoms that individuals have reason to value in a materialist society are actually harmful to their wellbeing. Using a different approach, Offer (2006) explores a number of other ways in which processes of social change associated with the growth of affluence in the UK and the USA have led to a construction of the meaning of individual freedom in terms of short-term, hedonistic gains. In doing this, he argues that these processes serve to erode important institutions of commitment in our societies and this is reflected in the growth of social problems experienced by affluent societies. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) argue that there is clear evidence that rising levels of inequality, which they see as related to the rise of individualism and the decline of social values, operate through the relational dimensions of our being to have demonstrable and significant costs for human beings and for societies.
A second way in which the conceptualization of human wellbeing in terms of individual freedom shows limitations in its capacity to inform social theory and policy is that it does not take adequate account of freedom trade-offs over time. The freedoms and wellbeing of one group of people in the present are often founded on the illbeing and struggles of others before them. Looking historically it is clear that present freedoms have often been won at the cost of great sacrifices of freedoms in the past. 16 It would be reasonable to think also, therefore, that future freedoms may come at the cost of sacrifices of freedoms in the present.
This notion is captured in one of the major challenges of our time, since essentially the issue of climate change requires us to deliberate collectively about how we are to develop more sustainable meanings about what human wellbeing should consist of and how it should be achieved. It is increasingly understood that the freedom of some to pursue unbounded and CO 2 intensive notions of wellbeing in the present generation is a huge threat to the wellbeing of others elsewhere on the planet over the immediately coming years and to the possibility of wellbeing of all in future generations. The 'Prosperity without Growth' report by the Commission for Sustainable Development in the UK, challenges us to reframe our notion of prosperity as disconnected from material wealth and possessions. By discussing the prospects of a carbon-reducing no-growth economy, this line of thinking establishes the agenda of whether we can voluntarily modify our notions of what freedom in developed societies comprises.
The shifting global debate over climate change also illustrates that the social meanings through which we can conceive of wellbeing are dynamic. They are in a process of ongoing construction and modification through all our relationships in society, at all levels: through our relationships with members of our families, our relationships in the political discourses of our nation states and our relationships with actors in the globalized media. Our notions of wellbeing are often conflicting, but they can change and in many circumstances can be regarded as being open to negotiation (Rosen, 1984) . This suggests that we can and do adapt our ideas in the short run through direct negotiations with others and in the longer run through our participation in changes in norms, perceptions and tastes at national and global levels.
These dynamics and the associated structured inequalities of the social generation of meanings have not sufficiently been taken into consideration by the capability approach so far. The emphasis on deliberation and on collective reasoning has not been paralleled with an explicit emphasis and analysis of the political dynamics at play. In The Idea of Justice, the problem of climate change is, for example, brushed aside by a simple acknowledgement that more in-depth collective reasoning will eventually find a solution and make developing and developed countries collectively agree on their collective interest in cutting down carbon emissions drastically.
Negotiating social wellbeing
To recap, the capability approach rests on the notion of reasoning, but reasoning depends upon the meanings that we share and that are constructed through our relationships in society. What we each understand to be valuable freedoms is dependent upon shared meanings and what we are prepared to agree upon in social collectives in order to live well together.
In The Idea of Justice, Sen talks about power in relation to capability: 'a capability is the power to do something' (Sen, 2009: 19) It has very little to do with power as Lukes or Foucault have suggested that we must understand it. As noted above, Sen's version of the capability approach refuses to commit itself to specifying which valuable freedoms public policy should promote. It is through public reasoning or public discussion that each society is to determine which freedoms it should promote or discourage. However, Sen's writings never acknowledge explicitly how the inevitable conflicts that arise from people's different conceptions of wellbeing are ultimately to be resolved. His faith in human reasoning is unshakeable.
This faith comes with an underestimation of the power that lies behind the meanings that can be brought to bear in such processes of public reasoning and deliberation. Anecdotally but tellingly, a question was asked in a lecture at the Sheldonian Theatre in Oxford in November 2009 about the ambiguous role of the media in public deliberation. Sen cited the case that more Bengali people were listening to the BBC than British people. The lecture chair, the Chancellor of Oxford, Chris Patten, retorted that we should start worrying though if more people listened to Fox News. Our point in this article is that the capability approach, as portrayed in Sen's writings, does not deal explicitly or adequately with these questions of meaning formation, and the nascent and real conflicts that lie behind them. It then does not consider how these influence the processes and outcomes of public deliberation.
Recognition of differences between people lies at the core of the capability approach, but this diversity also means that people are differently able to conceive of, to pursue and to achieve wellbeing. They engage differently with each other and are differently related to the structures of society. The exploration of social and economic differences carried out in the empirical work of the research group on Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) confirms that not all visions of wellbeing and the strategies that people may wish to adopt to achieve it will be compatible with each other. 17 In such circumstances explanations of the persistence of chronic poverty recognize that the poorest often have to sacrifice their wellbeing strategies and aspirations to accommodate or fit with the goals of other more powerful actors.
The context of poverty brings into sharp focus the observation that it is profoundly challenging for us all to simultaneously achieve our wellbeing goals at the same time as maintaining a coherent and inclusive society and a sustainable natural environment. A social wellbeing framework, and the methodology for empirical study that flows from it, offer a means of analysing the ways in which some people's views of wellbeing conflict with others and how in some circumstances the pursuit of wellbeing by some may result in the denial of the opportunities for wellbeing for others. A social conception of wellbeing is therefore profoundly a political one which identifies the trade-offs that must be confronted in political and policy systems if our efforts to live together well are to succeed.
It is important for the capability approach not to avoid explicit and in-depth discussion of the political and power dynamics of reasoning processes and their unavoidable trade-offs. Our ability to consent to live together in social collectivities depends in large part upon participants in reasoning being able to reach accommodation of each other's systems of meaning and value. We must expect, however, that such full accommodation cannot always be yielded, that is, that some issues and ideas will be 'essentially contested' (Lukes, 2005) . Recognizing this, we can understand that the systems by which value reasoning is conducted become a matter of prime importance. We need institutional arrangements for negotiating socially coherent wellbeing outcomes and strategies. 18 This is even more the case as the very notion of 'freedom' is also mediated by the social and cultural construction of meanings. This does not open the way for unbridled cultural relativism but highlights the need for a reasoning framework, which at the same time recognizes universal principles and does not automatically devalue specific meanings and values found among different individuals both across different societies, and within a same society.
Conclusion
The capability approach contains great potential for rethinking development and social policy, in both developed and developing country context. It resituates human beings, and their wellbeing, as the end concerns of economic and social processes. It is founded on the intrinsic dignity of human freedom and people's ability to be subjects of their own lives. It re-establishes the ethical foundations of the social sciences, and by not being a social theory, it allows a wide range of applications and interpretations.
Despite this enormous potential, there are also some serious shortcomings, all of which relate to the social and political nature of human wellbeing. In particular, the capability approach understates the practicalities of conducting value reasoning and the conflicts that may arise. A social conception of wellbeing calls for a more explicit acknowledgement of these conflicts and of the fact that some people's gains may be others' losses, for not all good things always go together. The optimism of The Idea of Justice, which has faith in reasoning overcoming 'unreason' (Sen, 2009: xviii) and resolving many of the world's problems, including climate change, needs to be tempered by a deeper reflection on the finitude of human reason, and a more explicit analysis of the reality of conflict and power which lies at the heart of the construction of meanings that make reasoning possible.
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